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The relationship between economic data, on the one hand, and asset
prices and monetary policy, on the other, has become a widely studied
topic in the academic literature—and for good reason. Macroeconomic
conditions are a key factor determining near-term policy expectations, and
those expectations reverberate throughout the ﬁnancial system by inﬂu-
encing the returns expected on all asset classes.
But despite being widely studied, our current knowledge of the interac-
tions between economic news and asset prices has many shortcomings, and
the results are puzzling in some dimensions. Perhaps most importantly, the
estimated eﬀects of data releases on monetary policy expectations and as-
set prices are found to be relatively small. This is the case even for those as-
sets that are known to be very sensitive to near-term monetary policy ex-
pectations, such as eurodollar futures and short-term Treasury securities.
This ﬁnding is surprising. After all, the literature over the past two
decades has argued that monetary policy to a large extent responds sys-
tematically to economic conditions. Indeed, the literature has made
tremendous progress estimating monetary policy rules that account for
these systematic responses in terms of low-frequency data (such as quar-
terly data). If monetary policy is so systematic, one would expect to see
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tions, and Mike McMorrow for excellent assistance with the analysis.asset prices around data releases. That is, the major economic data releases
would be expected to explain an extensive amount of the variation in assets
sensitive to near-term policy expectations.
In our view, the puzzle of the “detachment” of monetary policy expec-
tations and asset prices from the incoming economic news is partly related
to the diﬃculties associated with measuring the surprise component of that
news. Most studies to date compute a “surprise” measure for a given re-
lease based on expectations taken from a survey conducted ahead of the re-
lease. They then regress changes in an asset price on this surprise measure,
which we refer to as the standard “eventstudy” approach. The attempt to
isolate the unexpected component of the release was a vast improvement
over earlier eﬀorts that could not make such a separation, as only the un-
expected component should prompt a market reaction. However, this ap-
proach likely falls short of accurately measuring the market eﬀects of the
incoming news—perhaps considerably.
A problem with the standard eventstudy approach is that the macroeco-
nomic news is likely to be measured very poorly, for several reasons. First,
it is hard to accurately measure what the markets are expecting for a given
release at the time it comes out, including the full distribution of risks seen
for the release. Second, even if one accurately measured expectations, the
actual release may be seen as a noisy indicator of the underlying true fun-
damental factor that drives market responses. And third, the variable mea-
sured is usually only one component of a report. After all, most of these re-
ports are complicated, providing lots of information of varying relevance.
Thus, it is quite likely that the macroeconomic surprise included on the
right-hand-side of the eventstudy is only a very rough measure of the true
incoming news. This chapter focuses on measuring the reaction of asset
prices and monetary policy expectations to the “true” economic news em-
bedded in the major U.S. data releases. Rather than attempting to better
measure the data or the expectations, we focus on developing econometric
techniques that will adequately deal with the measurement problems asso-
ciated with the data surprises used in the existing eventstudy literature.
Our eﬀorts take us in two directions. First, we modify the standard
eventstudy regression framework to account for the possibility that the
measured surprises contain error. The measurement issues considered here
lead to a classical error-in-variables problem of a standard regression, one
that biases downward the estimated sensitivity of asset prices to the in-
coming data. We develop a new estimator that allows for measurement er-
ror and, hence, eliminates this downward bias. The procedure could be
used in other applications to correct for the error-in-variables problem.
Second, we employ a principal components approach that removes the
need to even try to measure the data surprises. In eﬀect, the approach uses
the observed market reactions to infer what the true data surprises were.
Such an approach may have appeal if one regards the incoming data as be-
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conditions that make it diﬃcult to measure the data surprise in the manner
of the standard eventstudy exercise.
The results provide us with unbiased estimates of the response of mone-
tary policy expectations and asset prices to the “true” surprise contained
in all of the major data releases. They also allow us to recover the impor-
tance of those true surprises. An important ﬁnding from the chapter is that
macroeconomic data releases matter to a much greater extent than found
in previous studies—that is, they account for a greater portion of the ﬂuc-
tuations in market interest rates. Moreover, using these estimators, we are
able to reﬁne a set of patterns in the responses that should be explained by
any model addressing the interactions between economic variables, mone-
tary policy, and asset prices.
8.2 Estimating the Eﬀects of Macroeconomic 
Announcements: Current Methods
Researchers in both macroeconomic and ﬁnancial economics are very
interested in understanding the linkage between monetary policy and asset
prices. To that end, one strand of literature has attempted to measure the
response of asset prices to monetary policy “shocks,” or the erratic and un-
predictable component of monetary policy decisions. But such shocks are
limited in size and account for only a very small portion of the variation in
asset prices. Instead, most of the movement in short-term interest rates
likely represents the systematic response of monetary policy to economic
developments. Thus, it may be more relevant to investigate the responses
of monetary policy expectations and asset prices to incoming news about
the economy.
A sizable literature has taken up this topic and has provided us with
some valuable results. The studies to date almost uniformly take an ap-
proach that is commonly referred to as “eventstudy.”
8.2.1 The Eventstudy Speciﬁcation
Papers in the eventstudy literature typically proceed in a simple regres-
sion framework in which the reaction of a given asset price (or market
yield) is regressed on the surprise components of the data release, as in the
following speciﬁcation:
(1)  st    zt   εt,
(1 ) zt   Mt   Et   [Mt],
where Mt is the released value of the macroeconomic announcement, and
Et– [Mt] is a measure of the market’s expectation ahead of the release. The
speciﬁcation assumes that the only market-moving information is the sur-
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tivity to that surprise—which is the primary interest of this chapter.
The basic approach implicit in speciﬁcation (1) has not varied much over
time, but the empirical implementation of the equation has changed in two
dimensions.
First, the measure of expectations has improved. Early papers in this
area had to model the market’s expectations either as past realized values
of the macroeconomic variables or as the outcome of forecasting models
that do not necessarily perform very well. More recently, researchers have
increasingly relied on surveys to measure expectations and to better isolate
the surprise component of data releases. Hence, the measurement of the
variable zt has likely improved over time.
Second, studies have increasingly used a narrower window to measure
the market response to the data release. Whereas earlier papers may have
used monthly or quarterly data, the eventstudy literature has moved to us-
ing changes at a daily frequency (see, for example, McQueen and Roley
[1993] and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson [2005]) or even in some cases
on an intraday bases (see, for example, Fleming and Remolona [1997] and
Balduzzi, Elton, and Green [2001]).1 The idea of using a narrower window
is to reduce the inﬂuence of other events that might be aﬀecting the asset
price in addition to the data surprise. In terms of the equation (1), it re-
duces the variance of the error term εt, which should improve the accuracy
of the estimate of the parameter  .
The eventstudy approach has importantly contributed to our under-
standing of the manner in which monetary policy expectations and asset
prices react to incoming economic data. Indeed, as we will show in the fol-
lowing, this approach ﬁnds that the market reaction to a number of re-
leases is statistically signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, in our view, the eventstudy
approach has some shortcomings that prevent it from recovering the mar-
ket response to a “true” macroeconomic data surprise.
8.2.2 The Econometric Problem: Noisy Data Surprises
The potential problem that arises with the eventstudy approach is that
the results will only be as good as the measure of data surprises included
on the right-hand side of the equation. Indeed, the model (1) implicitly as-
sumes that the measured data surprise zt truly captures the true macroeco-
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1. Several other papers use intraday data but focus primarily on foreign exchange rates, in-
cluding Andersen et al. (2003) and Faust et al. (2003). As an example of a paper using low-
frequency data, Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989) attempt to measure the inﬂuence of
macroeconomic shocks on equity prices using a monthly vector autoregression (VAR). Stock
and Watson (2003) provide a review of other papers that examine the relationship between ﬁ-
nancial variables and macroeconomic conditions at a monthly or quarterly frequency. Note,
however, that the primary interest in that paper is measuring the predictive power of ﬁnancial
variables for economic outcomes rather than the eﬀects of economic outcomes on ﬁnancial
variables.nomic news arising from the releases. If that is not the case, the estimated
parameter   will be biased.
Even with the improvements noted in the preceding, it is a somewhat du-
bious assumption that the variable zt is perfectly measured—or that it is
even well measured. Instead, it is more plausible that the variable zt con-
tains considerable measurement error, from a variety of sources.
First, it is unlikely that the survey measures used accurately capture the
market expectations at the time of the release. In the results presented in the
following, we collect those expectations from two surveys and splice them
together to create a full time series. Before September 2004, we use the
median response from the Money Market Services (MMS) survey, which is
a survey of professional forecasters taken the Friday before each release.
Since then, we instead use the median response from the regular survey
taken by Bloomberg. This ﬁgure is the most commonly discussed measure
of consensus expectations in the ﬁnancial markets.
But there are a number of reasons to believe that the expectations mea-
sured from these surveys are not necessarily appropriate for gauging the
market response. The survey respondents are not the relevant market par-
ticipants whose expectations matter. Moreover, the survey covers a variety
of respondents with very diﬀerent backgrounds and skill sets, raising ques-
tions about whether certain individual responses could distort the mea-
sures. It is not even clear that the respondents have the correct incentive
scheme, as we suspect that they may assign greater utility to having an out-
of-consensus call that comes in correct than having a consensus call that
comes in correct. And, last, we arbitrarily use the median from the panel,
though the argument for using this over the mean or some other measure
is not clear-cut.
In addition to concerns about the cross-section of panelists, we also have
some concerns about the timing of the surveys. Ideally, we would like to
know the market expectations the moment before the data release. The
MMS survey is instead taken the Friday before the release, making it some-
what stale. For those releases that come out on a Friday (e.g., the employ-
ment report), that leaves an entire week (and all the data released that
week) for expectations to evolve and move away from the survey response.
And the situation for the Bloomberg expectations is even worse. Those re-
sponses are submitted at irregular times. Most respondents enter their es-
timates about a week before the releases, but many, instead, do it two weeks
in advance, while others wait until the week of the release.2
Another source of mismeasurement of the macroeconomic surprise is
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2. To take an example, consider the employment report that was released on November 5,
2004. Of the seventy-eight responses to the survey, thirteen were submitted more than two
weeks in advance. Most of the responses, thirty-nine, came in about one week in advance
(with two others coming in earlier that week). And twenty-four respondents waited until the
week of the release to submit their views.the data release itself. The released data can be thought of as a noisy ver-
sion of the “true” economic fundamental to which the market responds.
Researchers usually focus on just one aspect of the release, and often that
one aspect can appear anomalous. A recent example was the advance gross
domestic product (GDP) report for the fourth quarter of 2005, which came
in well below the market’s expectations. That surprise owed in large part to
a puzzling drop in defense spending that quarter, and, hence, Wall Street
analysts generally dismissed the implications of the report.3
Overall, we believe that the measured data surprises could be quite noisy.
Market expectations are probably not measured particularly well, as the
survey used is a random variable that at best can be considered to be un-
biased but not measured without error. And the actual release is likely to
contain some noise relative to the true macroeconomic news that aﬀects
markets.
8.2.3 The Bias in Eventstudy Estimates
We start with the assumption that the macroeconomic surprises used in
the eventstudy literature are measured with error for the reasons discussed
in the preceding. In this case, the estimates obtained in the standard liter-
ature are plagued with error-in-variables bias.
To provide some structure for discussing the problem, we assume the
asset price change immediately around the release at time t is denoted by
 st. This market reaction is driven by the true macroeconomic news con-
tained in the announcement, which we denote zt
∗, according to the follow-
ing equation:
(2)  st    zt
∗   εt.
We are interested in measuring the sensitivity of ﬁnancial markets to the
true economic news, captured by the parameter  . The residual εt captures
movements in the asset price in that window that are not driven by the data
surprise (or at least not under this linear structure).
To estimate equation (2), most researchers attempt to measure the true
macroeconomic news zt
∗as the diﬀerence between the released data and the
expectation of that data, where the expectation is typically determined
from a survey taken in advance of the release. But, as previously discussed,
there are two potential problems with that measure—that the release may
be seen as a noisy version of the true relevance of the news and that the ex-
pectations may be measured poorly. Considering this, we should perhaps
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3. For example, David Greenlaw from Morgan Stanley summarized the report as follows:
“Much weaker than expected report. Both ﬁnal sales and inventories came in well below ex-
pectations in Q4 [2005]. However, we believe that a signiﬁcant portion of the downside is likely
to be recouped in Q1 . . . Defense [spending] plunged 13% in Q4. We suspect that at least some
of this drop reﬂects a timing quirk that will be unwound in Q1.” (David Greenlaw and Ted
Weisman, GDP [Q4 Advance], Morgan Stanley Economic Data Bulletin, January 27, 2006)take the measured data surprises to be a noisy representation of the true
economic news, as follows:
(3) zt   zt
∗    t,
where zt denotes the measured data surprise. In this case, the mismeasure-
ment of the true data surprise is captured in the variable  t.
Using this proxy for the true macroeconomic news, researchers typically
resort to estimating the following equation:
(4)  st    zt   υt,
using an ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression. However, given the pre-
ceding structure, the error term from the estimated equation is
(5) υt   εt      t,
which is negatively correlated with the right-hand-side variable in the re-
gression. This correlation, of course, results in the bias in the regression es-
timate of  .
To quantify the bias, we assume that the true macroeconomic news has
a variance of  2
z∗ and that the measurement error is mean zero conditional
on the true surprise (Et[ t|zt
∗]) and has a variance of  2
 . We also assume that
the portion of the asset price movement not explained by the macroeco-
nomic surprise (εt) is mean zero conditional on the true news and the mea-
surement error (Et[εt| t, zt
∗]) and has a variance of  ε
2. Under these assump-
tions, the estimate obtained by an OLS regression is:
(6)   ˆOLS      .
This estimate has the standard downward bias (toward zero), which is
the standard result in the presence of an error-in-variables problem. Based
on this consideration, we argue that the typical eventstudy estimation may
understate the inﬂuence of macroeconomic news on asset prices.
At this point, it is useful to note that we have considered two forms of
mismeasurement of the macroeconomic news—one based on noise in our
reading of the market’s expectations, and one based on noise in the release
itself. Both forms are captured by equation (3), and, hence, the bias in the
OLS estimates applies to both of them. Nevertheless, the interpretation of
the results is diﬀerent depending on which of the two sources predomi-
nantly accounts for the mismeasurement. If the mismeasurement is in
terms of measuring the market’s expectations, then the OLS estimates are
actually missing part of the market reaction. If instead the noise is con-
tained in the actual data, then the market is reacting by less, as it is doing
the signal extraction problem and discounting the value of the released
data. In that case, the OLS estimates are an accurate measure of the true
(but limited) market reaction to the released data.
 2
   
 2
z∗    2
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adjusting for the measurement error from these two sources. There are sev-
eral potential solutions. One is to ﬁnd an instrument, something that is cor-
related with the true macroeconomic news but uncorrelated with the mea-
surement error. But such instruments do not exist, leaving the problem of
estimation unresolved. Another solution is to improve the data itself, for
example, by better measuring market expectations. In that regard, the
emergence of economic derivatives may be useful in that they may provide
a more accurate and timely reading of market expectations. Still, given all
of the preceding considerations, it is not clear that we will ever have a fully
accurately measure the macroeconomic news.
In this chapter, we take an alternative approach in which we attempt to
address the issue through econometric technique. We will ultimately de-
velop two methods that help us resolve some of these issues and allow us to
better understand the linkages from economic news to asset prices and
monetary policy expectations.
8.3 Identiﬁcation through Censoring
The problem of error-in-variables that we discuss in the preceding is, in
fact, a problem of identiﬁcation. To see that, consider the case of mea-
suring the eﬀect of a single data release on a single asset price. In that situ-
ation, we can compute only three statistics: the variance of the asset price,
the variance of the macroeconomic news, and the covariance between
them. The problem is that these moments are determined by four under-
lying parameters:  ,  2
z∗,  2
 , and  ε
2. Thus, the solution is not identiﬁed, or
there is a continuum of solutions.
In the preceding we noted that an instrumental-variables approach is
one way of solving the problem, if one were able to ﬁnd an appropriate in-
strument. Note that the availability of such an instrument basically solves
the identiﬁcation problem. For a variable  t to be a valid instrument, it
must be correlated with the true news but uncorrelated with the measure-
ment error, as follows:
(7) zt
∗      t   κt,
The availability of this instrument adds three pieces of information (the
variance of  t, its covariance with the measured news, and its covariance
with the asset price response), while only adding two unknown variables ( 
and the variance of κ). As long as   is diﬀerent from 0, these additional
conditions resolve the identiﬁcation problem. However, as noted in the
preceding, we cannot think of an instrument that is valid in the circum-
stances studied in this chapter.
In the absence of a valid instrument, the question is whether we can solve
the identiﬁcation problem through some other means. We will do so by de-
veloping a new technique that we label “identiﬁcation through censoring.”
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To demonstrate the methodology, we ﬁrst assume that there is only one
macroeconomic announcement at a given time. One special feature of
macroeconomic announcements is that they occur at prespeciﬁed days.
This is important because it implies that we can ﬁnd a sample of other days
(or times) at which the magnitude of the surprise variable is exactly 0.
When the variable is exactly equal to 0, it means that its error-in-variables
is 0 as well. This “censoring” of the measurement error will provide the
identiﬁcation.4
Formally, this situation can be described by the following equation:
(8)  st   
where D is the set of days (or times) on which the announcements take
place. We are assuming that no announcements take place the day before
those included in D. Under the assumption that the disturbance εt is
homoskedastic, we can use the variance of the asset price observed at time
t – 1 as additional information in the identiﬁcation. In that case, the fol-
lowing equations hold:
(9) var( st 1)    ε
2
var( st)    2 2
z∗    ε
2
var(zt)    2
z∗    2
 
cov( st, zt)      2
z∗
This is a system of four equations and four unknowns that can be solved
for the parameters. Most importantly, the sensitivity of the asset price to
the incoming news can be solved as follows:
(10)    .
This estimator is in the spirit of Rigobon and Sack (2004), in which the
estimator depended on the change in the variance relative to the change in
the covariance. Here, the change in the covariance is just the covariance it-
self, as the macroeconomic surprise has no variance when it is censored.
The preceding computations rely on the assumption that the structural
var( st)   var( st   1)
   
cov( st, zt)
t ∈ D
t   1 ∈ D
  zt   εt
εt
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4. This intuition comes from Goldberger (1991), who argues that the variance of the error-
in-variables in survey data depends on the size of the announcement. He used the following
example: If you ask how many cigarettes a person smokes in a day, a nonsmoker will answer
zero—and that reply has no error-in-variables whatsoever. But someone who smokes a pack
and a half a day will probably have a sizable error. In other words, the magnitude of the error
depends on the magnitude of the reply, with complete censoring of the error at zero.shocks in the asset price equation (εt) are homoskedastic. This is a fairly
strong assumption, and one that is not necessary. To derive an estimator
like equation (10), all we need is a prediction of what the variance would
have been like in the absence of the macroeconomic news. Thus, we can in-
corporate heteroskedasticity to the degree that it is predictable. In other
words, the identifying assumption is that the variance of εt is predictable.
For example, suppose we observe a release at 8:30, and as a “control win-
dow” we use a thirty-minute interval from the previous afternoon at 2:30.
The preceding assumes that the variance of εt around 8:30 is the same as
that around 2:30 on the previous day. But even on days of no announce-
ments, this does not seem to be the case. Instead, we require a much weaker
assumption—that the shift in the variance of εt on announcement days is
the same as the shift on nonannouncement days, or
(11)  2
ε,t 1,8:30    2
ε,t 2,2:30    2
ε,t,8:30    2
ε,t 1,2:30.
This assumption allows for the data to have heteroskedasticity over our
sample, as long as that heteroskedasticity looks the same on announce-
ment and nonannouncement days. In this case, the estimator (10) still
works if we replace the variances with the shift in the variances. This is the
assumption that we will employ in the empirical results in the following.
This estimator eliminates the bias coming from error-in-variables that
aﬀects the typical OLS estimates. However, the estimator is only as good as
its identifying assumptions. The two main identiﬁcation assumptions
needed are that the errors-in-variable are classical and that the variance of
the asset prices is predictable (so that we can make an accurate judgment
of what the variance would have been in the absence of the macroeconomic
surprise). Conditional on those identifying assumptions, the coeﬃcients
from this procedure are accurate. However, if either of the two main as-
sumptions is violated, the estimates are biased. We will return to these is-
sues in the following.
8.3.2 The Case of Multiple Macroeconomic Announcements
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS), and other government agencies would make our lives easier if
they released one statistic at a time. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Be-
cause diﬀerent releases follow diﬀerent schedules, often multiple impor-
tant releases will randomly coincide in both the date and time.
If this problem were just limited to coincidence, we could deal with it by
simply eliminating those days with multiple releases. Unfortunately, some
of the data releases always coincide with one another. This is the case for
those reports that include multiple statistics that have market inﬂuence.
For example, the employment report involves the simultaneous release of
nonfarm payrolls, the unemployment rate, and average hourly earnings—
each of which are found to have an independent eﬀect on markets.
344 Robert Rigobon and Brian SackIn the OLS framework, we can deal with this simultaneity by simply put-
ting the multiple releases into a single regression. We can also address this
issue in the identiﬁcation-through-censoring approach. To achieve identi-
ﬁcation in such circumstances, it turns out that we simply have to incorpo-
rate more than one asset price. For simplicity, we will show this point for
the case of two announcements. Also, for simplicity let us assume that the
structural shock εt is homoskedastic. In this case, the model has the fol-
lowing structure:
(12)  st    1   z
∗
1,t    2   z
∗
2,t   εt
z1,t   z
∗
1,t    1,t
z2,t   z
∗
2,t    2,t,
where the errors in measuring the true surprises ( 1,t and  2,t) are likely to
be correlated.
Note ﬁrst that the identiﬁcation is lost. The covariance matrix of the as-
set price and the two measures of macroeconomic surprises provides six
equations, and the variance of the asset price when there are no surprises
provides a seventh moment. But the model has nine unknown parameters:






 1,  2




2, and the co-
variance between  1 and  2. The underidentiﬁcation is even more severe in
the case of three simultaneous announcements.
The solution to the problem is to consider additional asset prices. If we
consider two asset prices, we have the following system of equations:
(13)  s1,t    1,1z
∗
1,t    1,2z
∗
2,t   ε1,t
 s2,t    2,1z
∗
1,t    2,2z
∗
2,t   ε2,t
z1,t   z
∗
1,t    1,t
z2,t   z
∗
2,t    2,t,
where the structural shocks ε1,t and ε2,t are possibly correlated, and the er-
rors in the macroeconomic surprises are, as before, also correlated. We
have now achieved identiﬁcation. The variance-covariance matrix of the
asset prices and the macroeconomic surprises on both announcement and
nonannouncement days provides thirteen moment conditions. These are
suﬃcient to solve for the thirteen unknown parameters.5
What delivers the identiﬁcation? It comes from the fact that the noise
contained in our measures of the macroeconomic announcements has to
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5. Adding the second asset price brings six new moment conditions—its variance and its
covariance with the other asset price on both announcement days and nonannouncement
days, and its covariances with the two measures of surprise on announcement days and its
variance on nonannouncement days) while adding only four new parameters ( 2,1,  2,2,  ε
2
2,
and the covariance between ε1 and ε2).be the same independent of the asset price we are considering. That re-
striction allows the incorporation of an additional asset to bring new in-
formation for the identiﬁcation.
8.3.3 Implementation of the Estimator
In the following results, we will include ﬁve diﬀerent asset prices and will
allow for as many as three simultaneous releases. (All details are described
in the next section.) This set-up implies that our estimator is always over-
identiﬁed. To estimate the parameter values, we use a generalized method
of movements (GMM) estimator that seeks to minimize the squared devi-
ations of the errors for each moment condition.6 It can be shown that this
estimator is consistent and that the estimates are asymptotically normal.
8.4 The Estimated Eﬀects of Macroeconomic Surprises
This section begins by describing the data that we use and some of the
speciﬁc decisions made in implementing the various approaches. It then
provides some results from both the standard eventstudy estimator and the
identiﬁcation-through-censoring approach.
8.4.1 Data
In the results that follow, we measure the reaction of ﬁve ﬁnancial vari-
ables to incoming macroeconomic news. The set of ﬁnancial variables is in-
tended to capture the behavior of near-term policy expectations as well as
broader asset prices.
Speciﬁcally, we include several near-term interest rates that are very sen-
sitive to monetary policy. Eurodollar futures rates ere probably the most
useful, liquid instrument for that purpose. We, therefore, include the rates
on the second and fourth eurodollar contracts to expire—which will reﬂect
changes in monetary policy expectations roughly at horizons of six and
twelve months ahead.7 We also include the two-year Treasury yield, which
is very sensitive to the expected path of monetary policy beyond the hori-
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6. So that the relative importance of the moment conditions is not inﬂuenced by the unit of
measure, we normalize the movements in each asset price by their standard deviation. The re-
sults, however, are expressed in terms of basis points for yields and percentage points for eq-
uities.
7. The second contract will have between three and six months to expiration (with an aver-
age of 4.5). It is tied to the three-month Libor rate, which will be sensitive to the expected av-
erage funds rate over those three months (with an average of 1.5). Adding together these av-
erages yields six months. Similar calculations yield twelve months for the fourth contract. We
exclude the ﬁrst and third contracts because we felt that much of their information would be
redundant. In addition, we worried that the variation in the expiration of the ﬁrst contact
from zero to three months might be more problematic (given institutional details such as the
spacing of meetings).zon covered by the eurodollar contracts, and the ten-year Treasury yield.
Last, we include the S&P 500 index.8
For all of these asset prices, we use intraday data. This feature alone pro-
vides a sizable improvement over daily eventstudy exercises. As noted in
the preceding, with intraday data, we can look at a narrow window around
the time of the release—an interval that includes the inﬂuence of data re-
leases at a given time but excludes most other market-moving events. In
eﬀect, we are shrinking the size of the error term εt relative to the inﬂuence
of the data.
The intraday data slices we consider are thirty-minutes long, beginning
ﬁve minutes before the time of an announcement to avoid any complica-
tions from variation in the precise timing of the quotes or of the releases.
The data releases that we consider all take place at either 8:30 a.m. 9:15
a.m., or 10:00 a.m., giving us slices that run from 8:25 to 8:55 a.m., 9:10 to
9:40 a.m., and 9:55 to 10:25 a.m.
For equities, unfortunately, we only have intraday quotes from when the
stock market is open, from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Thus, we have to modify
our slices accordingly. For the 8:30 a.m. and 9:15 a.m. releases, we use the
change in the S&P index from the previous close to 9:55 a.m. For the 10:00
a.m. release, we can use the same slice that we use for the interest rates.
The control window that we use in each case is a thirty-minute win-
dow around 2:30 p.m. on the previous afternoon. We use the variance-
covariance matrix in that window to predict what the variance-covariance
matrix would have been in the event window in the absence of the data
release.
The advantage of using the intraday quotes is shown in ﬁgure 8.l, which
focuses on the response of the two-year Treasury yield to the nonfarm pay-
rolls statistic from the monthly Employment Situationreport from the BLS.
This is the data release that, in recent years at least, has commanded the
most attention in ﬁnancial markets. As can be seen, there is a clear positive
relationship between surprises in the payroll release and the movement in
the two-year yield. Moreover, this relationship tightens if we use intraday
data instead of daily data.
We investigate the market reactions to thirteen diﬀerent data releases.
Those releases are shown in table 8.l, along with some information about
the frequency of the release and the sample over which we have a measure
of market expectations. We generally begin our sample in 1994, though the
sample for the Chicago Purchasing Manufacturers Index (PMI) has a
shorter sample because we do not have a measure of market expectations
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8. We had hoped to include exchange rates as well, but our intraday data did not extend
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Fig. 8.1 Response of the two-year yield to payroll surprises
Table 8.1 Macroeconomic data announcements
Release Date of ﬁrst No. of 
Release time Frequency observation observations
Nonfarm payrolls 8:30 Monthly 7-Jan-94 137
Hourly earnings 8:30 Monthly 4-Feb-94 134
GDP (advance) 8:30 Quarterly 28-Jan-94 46
Retail sales (excl. autos) 8:30 Monthly 13-Jan-94 137
Core Consumer Price Index 8:30 Monthly 13-Jan-94 137
Core Producer Price Index 8:30 Monthly 12-Jan-94 137
Housing starts 8:30 Monthly 20-Jan-94 135
Durable goods 8:30 Monthly 27-Jan-94 135
Capacity utilization 9:15 Monthly 14-Jan-94 137
Institute for Supply Management 
Manufacturing Index 10:00 Monthly 3-Jan-94 133
Chicago Purchasing 
Manufacturers Index 10:00 Monthly 31-Dec-99 58
Consumer conﬁdence 10:00 Monthly 25-Jan-94 137
New home sales 10:00 Monthly 2-Feb-94 136until December 1999. Our list includes nearly all of the major macroeco-
nomic indicators that are generally seen as signiﬁcant market movers.9
8.4.2 Evenstudy Estimates
Even though it may have the shortcomings discussed in the preceding,
we still view the standard eventstudy regression as a very useful exercise,
one that can tell us a lot about how asset prices and monetary policy ex-
pectations are aﬀected by incoming data. The preceding discussion simply
cautions that the resulting coeﬃcients may have some downward bias, thus
understating the importance of the data. We implement the eventstudy re-
gression per release, using the data described in the preceding. The results
are shown in table 8.2.
One of the primary ﬁndings from this exercise is that monetary policy ex-
pectations react signiﬁcantly to incoming data. The expected path of the
federal funds rate (as captured in eurodollar futures) generally shifts up
signiﬁcantly in response to both strong data on growth (such as retail sales)
and high data on inﬂation (such as core CPI). Overall, we ﬁnd that twelve
of the thirteen macroeconomic variables considered prompt a signiﬁcant
reaction in the eurodollar futures rates.10
A second ﬁnding is that the eﬀect of the data releases continues to be siz-
able even as the maturity of the instrument is extended. Indeed, the two-
year yield often moves by about the same amount as the eurodollar futures
rates, suggesting that any inﬂuence on monetary policy is seen as being
very persistent.11The sensitivity of market yields extends all the way out to
the ten-year Treasury note. The magnitude of its reaction is large enough
that it suggests that even distant forward rates are reacting to the news, as
found by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).12
A ﬁnal observation from the eventstudy results has to do with the reac-
tion of equity markets. The detachment issue seems particularly problem-
atic for equities, as even the most important data releases (such as nonfarm
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9. In all of the results that follow, we discard those days for which we have multiple releases.
For the two series from the employment report (nonfarm payrolls and hourly earnings), we
always consider their eﬀects together, as discussed in the preceding.
10. Other studies, including Fleming and Remolona (1997), Balduzzi, Elton, and Green
(2001), and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), have found that market interest rates re-
spond signiﬁcantly to a wide range of macroeconomic data releases.
11. A similar result was found by Kohn and Sack (2003). They noted a similar persistence
in the response to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statements and inferred that
those statements may be seen as conveying information about the state of the economy in ad-
dition to information about the near-term direction of policy.
12. That paper looked explicitly at distant forward rates and found that they often re-
sponded to data in the same direction as near-term forward rates. The authors developed the
case that this response reﬂected the fact that long-term inﬂation expectations in the United
States are variable, a case strengthened by the fact that similar sensitivity is not observed in
the United Kingdom, perhaps because of its explicit inﬂation target.payrolls) do not prompt a signiﬁcant market reaction.13 But looking at the
response of equities to all of the releases provides us with an important clue
about why that may be the case.
The likely explanation for this ﬁnding is that a release such as nonfarm
payrolls contains oﬀsetting forces on equity prices. On the one hand, a
strong report would suggest more strength in the economy and, hence, bet-
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13. By contrast, equities do appear to react signiﬁcantly to monetary policy shocks, as
shown by Bernanke and Kuttner (2003).
Table 8.2 Eﬀects of macroeconomic data surprises on asset prices: eventstudy approach
Percentage of Y2
explained by
ED2 ED4 Y2 Y10 S&P data surprise
Nonfarm payrolls 5.74** 8.16** 6.67** 5.34** –0.03 0.46
(0.57) (0.78) (0.66) (0.57) (0.07)
Hourly earnings 1.72** 2.03** 2.01** 1.84** –0.23** —
(0.79) (1.11) (0.92) (0.76) (0.07)
GDP (advance) 1.66** 2.28** 1.84** 1.25** 0.15 0.25
(0.73) (0.92) (0.77) (0.71) (0.09)
Retail sales (excl. autos) 2.27** 3.20** 2.05** 1.91** 0.11 0.23
(0.57) (0.78) (0.55) (0.43) (0.07)
Core Consumer Price Index 1.89** 2.62** 1.96** 1.97** –0.21** 0.28
(0.37) (0.50) (0.41) (0.44) (0.09)
Core Producer Price Index 1.28** 1.78** 1.39** 1.42** –0.20** 0.17
(0.33) (0.46) (0.40) (0.40) (0.08)
Housing starts 0.33 0.32 0.23 0.28 –0.07 0.01
(0.21) (0.27) (0.24) (0.19) (0.07)
Durable goods 1.02** 1.37** 1.34** 1.16** –0.04 0.25
(0.21) (0.33) (0.26) (0.24) (0.05)
Capacity utilization 0.91** 1.36** 1.03** 1.01** 0.05 0.19
(0.20) (0.26) (0.19) (0.17) (0.06)
ISM Manufacturing Index 1.78** 2.56** 2.07** 2.04** –0.05 0.31
(0.25) (0.41) (0.33) (0.34) (0.04)
Chicago Purchasing 1.30** 1.99** 1.55** 1.55** 0.08 0.30
Manufacturers Index (0.31) (0.48) (0.43) (0.36) (0.06)
Consumer conﬁdence 1.80** 2.15** 1.74** 1.70** 0.08 0.26
(0.33) (0.44) (0.35) (0.29) (0.04)
New home sales 1.02** 1.25** 1.01** 0.85** –0.05 0.16
(0.25) (0.31) (0.25) (0.24) (0.04)
Notes:The table shows the estimated response of the ﬁnancial variable (in basis points for rates and per-
centage points for equities) to a 1 standard deviation surprise in the economic release. ED2   the rate
on the second eurodollar futures contract (a proxy for monetary policy expectations about six months
ahead); ED4   the rate on the fourth eurodollar futures contract (a proxy for policy expectations about
twelve months ahead); Y2   the two-year Treasury yield; Y10   the ten-year Treasury yield; and S&P
  the S&P 500 index. The last column reports the R-squared statistic for the Y2 regression. No statistic
is reported for hourly earnings because it is estimated in the same regression as nonfarm payrolls.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.ter earnings prospects, which should boost equity prices. On the other
hand, it also raises long-term interest rates, which should lower equity
prices. These two forces oﬀset one another, leaving the net eﬀect on equity
prices insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. A similar story could be told for all
of the demand-side indicators, which all have no eﬀect on equities.
If this were in fact the case, then we should more clearly see a negative
response of equity prices to data that is directly about inﬂation. The reason
is that there is no oﬀsetting news in that case—higher inﬂation implies that
rates will be higher but not that growth will be higher. Thus, equity prices
should fall. Indeed, this is precisely what we ﬁnd. Indeed, the S&P index re-
acts negatively and signiﬁcantly to positive surprises in core CPI, core Pro-
ducer Price Index (PPI), and hourly earnings—every single inﬂation mea-
sure considered.14
Overall, the eventstudy regressions provide an interesting pattern of
market responses to diﬀerent types of incoming news. Nevertheless, the R-
squared statistics from the regressions are relatively low, generally ranging
from 0.15 to 0.50. In other words, the eventstudy regressions typically ac-
count for only a small portion of the variance of the market reactions, even
if we focus on the movements in the thirty-minute window bracketing the
announcement. This last observation is the area in which we will see some
improvement under the new estimator.
8.4.3 Identiﬁcation-though-Censoring Estimates
Table 8.3 shows the estimated responses under the identiﬁcation-by-
censoring (IC) approach. Broadly speaking, the patterns of the responses
are the same as in the eventstudy (ES) exercise: stronger-than-expected
readings on growth or higher-than-expected readings on inﬂation tend to
boost market interest rates. The stock market response to incoming data
on growth is mixed and often insigniﬁcant, while it reacts negatively to in-
coming data on inﬂation.
The primary diﬀerence between the ES and IC approaches is the magni-
tude of the market responses. The IC coeﬃcients are often two or three
times as large as the ES coeﬃcients. This ﬁnding suggests that the problem
of detachment is, to a large extent at least, associated with the mismea-
surement of macroeconomic news.
For example, a 1 standard deviation upward surprise to core CPI (nearly
0.1 percentage point) is estimated to increase yields 6 to 9 basis points,
rather than the response of 2 to 2.5 basis points found under ES. It is worth
considering again how to interpret this diﬀerence. The IC measure is cap-
turing the market response to a true core CPI surprise, one that market par-
Noisy Macroeconomic Announcements, Monetary Policy, and Asset Prices 351
14. To our knowledge, this is not an empirical fact that has been emphasized in the litera-
ture to date. Fair (2003) ﬁnds a positive reaction of equities to inﬂation news. McQueen and
Roley (1993) ﬁnd a reaction that diﬀers across diﬀerent states of the business cycle, with neg-
ative responses for some variables in some states.ticipants are convinced has no measurement error in it and one for which
the market expectations are measured perfectly. The true CPI release may
be discounted if it is seen as containing measurement error (e.g., a higher-
than-expected reading driven by a single component, such as the price of
lodging away from home), or its estimated eﬀect under the ES may be down-
ward biased if the market’s expectations were measured improperly.
One implication of the results is that monetary policy expectations and
asset prices may be more systematically related to incoming data than
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ED2 ED4 Y2 Y10 S&P to noise
Nonfarm payrolls 8.65 7.65 10.33 9.62 0.09 0.31
(0.20) (0.11) (0.24) (0.07) (0.00)
Hourly earnings 10.52 4.78 7.57 12.71 –1.16 0.70
(0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.29) (0.00)
GDP (advance) 5.71 7.39 5.95 5.15 0.02 0.42
(0.28) (0.30) (0.28) (0.25) (0.00)
Retail sales (excl. autos) 6.00 8.19 5.49 4.25 0.02 0.70
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.39) (0.00)
Core Consumer Price Index 6.43 8.87 6.61 7.59 –0.94 0.77
(0.72) (0.64) (0.66) (1.16) (0.05)
Core Producer Price Index 4.81 6.30 5.33 5.40 –0.68 0.31
(1.21) (1.45) (1.09) (1.09) (0.09)
Housing starts 1.15 1.08 0.95 0.24 –0.01 0.00
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (1.88) (0.00)
Durable goods 1.79 2.76 2.35 1.86 –0.01 0.24
(0.17) (0.12) (0.15) (0.22) (0.05)
Capacity utilization 8.63 11.21 7.99 7.06 1.42 0.92
(1.57) (0.81) (0.93) (0.81) (0.00)
ISM Manufacturing Index 10.92 17.13 13.94 14.06 –1.11 0.94
(0.62) (0.50) (0.57) (0.59) (0.01)
Chicago Purchasing  2.42 3.57 3.12 2.94 0.16 0.50
Manufacturers Index (2.43) (1.74) (8.76) (2.25) (0.07)
Consumer conﬁdence 9.69 12.40 9.67 8.58 0.80 0.90
(0.72) (0.75) (0.77) (0.69) (0.03)
New home sales 8.63 8.19 9.12 8.64 –0.88 0.95
(1.57) (1.20) (1.56) (1.98) (0.09)
Notes:The table shows the estimated response of the ﬁnancial variable (in basis points for rates and per-
centage points for equities) to a 1 standard deviation surprise in the “true” economic release (that mea-
sured without noise). ED2   the rate on the second eurodollar futures contract (a proxy for monetary
policy expectations about six months ahead); ED4   the rate on the fourth eurodollar futures contract
(a proxy for policy expectations about twelve months ahead); Y2   the two-year Treasury yield; Y10  
the ten-year Treasury yield; and S&P   the S&P 500 index. The last column reports the fraction of the
variation in the survey-based surprise measure that is estimated to be noise.found under the ES approach. This conclusion accords with our under-
standing of monetary policy from the (lower-frequency) macroeconomic
literature, including the view that one way policy has been eﬀective over the
past decade is by systematically responding to changes in economic condi-
tions. Our results provide a high-frequency version of that conclusion.
One issue is that the results appear “too good” in some sense. The esti-
mated amount of noise in the data announcements, a statistic that is also
identiﬁed in the IC procedure, tends to be very high for many of the re-
leases. (This pattern, of course, is directly related to the fact that the IC co-
eﬃcients are several times larger than the ES coeﬃcients.) For example, the
results suggest that 31 percent of the variation in the nonfarm payrolls sur-
prise is due to noise, while 77 percent of the variation in the core CPI re-
lease is due to noise.
It is somewhat hard to grasp just how much noise one would expect rel-
ative to some actual “truth” that we never observe. However, some of the
readings from table 8.2 are clearly implausible. For example, we doubt that
94 percent of the measured surprise associated with the Institute for
Supply Management (ISM) index is actually noise.
The extent of the estimated noise may raise some questions about
whether the identiﬁcation assumptions hold. We might be particularly
concerned about our eﬀorts to predict what the variance of the asset prices
would have been in the absence of the macroeconomic surprise, as needed
in the IC procedure. Note that the estimates of both the sensitivity of the
market response ( ) and the amount of noise in the surprises ( ε) tend to
increase in the shift in the variance of the asset price between nonan-
nouncement days and announcement days. Hence, if we are underestimat-
ing the variance that would be present in the absence of a macroeconomic
announcement, we would be overestimating both of these parameters.
One reason to suspect this pattern is that the macroeconomic surprises
measured on the right-hand side of our equations often coincide with the
release of other data that might move markets.15 For example, the employ-
ment report not only includes the current month surprise to nonfarm pay-
rolls, but also revisions to payrolls in the two previous months. Thus, even
in the absence of a surprise regarding the current month payroll, one might
expect more market volatility than on a nonannouncement day because of
the possible market reaction to this other information.
If this were the case, the IC estimates presented in table 8.3 may have
some upward bias. But note that this upward bias exists because the data
release is actually more meaningful than captured by the surprise measure
on the right-hand side of the equation. Thus, it still likely reﬂects that the
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15. In addition, the announcement itself (even if it is on expectation) could result in some
variance of the asset price because it would presumably reduce uncertainty and cause in-
vestors who had diﬀerent expectations to adjust their positions and views.macroeconomic news is more important than accounted for by the event-
study approach. We might, therefore, want to think of an estimator that
can better incorporate that additional information.
8.5 A Principal Components Exercise
This last consideration leads us in the direction of a completely diﬀerent
but complementary approach. The IC estimator was developed out of con-
cern that the macroeconomic surprise variable may be measured poorly, in-
troducing too much variation into that measure. But perhaps the bigger
problem is the opposite one—that the right-hand-side variable does not
capture enough of the surprise in a given data release.
This would be the case if the data release contained market-moving in-
formation other than that represented in the surprise measures considered
in the preceding. To be sure, most data releases are complicated and con-
vey many pieces of information. It may be diﬃcult to determine a macro-
economic surprise measure that captures all of that information.16
An alternative approach that avoids this diﬃculty is to let the ﬁnancial
market data itself determine the data surprise. Speciﬁcally, we again con-
sider the movements of the four interest rates and equity prices in the
thirty-minute window around a given release. Our identiﬁcation assump-
tion is that the primary event driving the markets in those windows is the
data release—an assumption that is certainly plausible for the narrow win-
dow that we consider around the release. We are not ruling out that other
events take place in that window, but if there does appear to be one com-
mon event, we will assign its eﬀects to the data release.
The approach that we use to implement this assumption is principal
components. For a given release, we stack the market reactions into a ma-
trix with one row per observation and one column for each asset price (the
second and fourth eurodollar contracts, the two-year Treasury yield, the
ten-year Treasury yield, and the S&P index). The principal components ex-
ercise determines a set of orthogonal factors F(same dimensions as X) that
are linear combinations of the original data series:
(14) F   X   A,
where A A I. As a result, the variance-covariance matrix of the responses
of the ﬁnancial variables is given by F F   A      A, where   is a diago-
nal matrix containing the variances of the factors.
The factors are ordered by the magnitude of their variances (with the
factor with the highest variance listed ﬁrst). In this sense, the ﬁrst factor ex-
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16. In the preceding, we have the example of the payrolls release and the relevance of con-
current revisions to past months’ payrolls releases. Other examples are quite that retail sales
ex-autos coincides with total retail sales (including autos), capacity utilization coincides with
industrial production, and so on.plains as much of the variation across the observable variables as possible,
the second factor captures as much additional variation as possible, and so
on.17 The loadings of the ﬁnancial variables on each of the factors is given
by the inverse of the matrix A, or A .
This approach is more general than the IC estimator. It does not require
the two identifying assumptions needed in that case, and it can capture a
broader set of information than measured by the surprise variables in-
cluded in the IC and ES approaches. The potential cost, however, is that it
could accidentally include some variation not truly associated with the
data release. A ﬁnding that there is a strong co-movement in the asset
prices over the thirty-minute window around the data release would boost
our conﬁdence that the procedure is picking up the eﬀects of that release.
As reported in table 8.4, it turns out that a single factor explains the vast
majority of the market reaction to each release. This factor typically ac-
counts for 90 percent to 95 percent of the variation in the asset prices in 
the thirty-minute window.18 It is this movement that we associate with the
data release, as the release is presumably the dominant market event in the
window.19
In this case, the ﬁrst principal component provides a measure of the true
data surprise, one that incorporates all of the market-sensitive news in-
cluded in a given release. As we would expect, these data surprises are
somewhat correlated with the survey-based surprises used in the preced-
ing. Table 8.4 shows that the survey-based surprises account for as much as
50 percent of the variation in the ﬁrst principal component. Thus, clearly
the surprises used in the ES exercise are an important component of the to-
tal news around a data release. However, they are not a complete measure
of the market-sensitive news contained in the release, as suggested by the
additional (unexplained) variation in the ﬁrst principal component.
Figure 8.2 presents the example for ex-auto retail sales. On the horizon-
tal axis is the survey-based surprise used in the preceding, and on the ver-
tical axis is the ﬁrst principal component (normalized in a way to make it
most comparable to the retail sales release). Again, the two measures are
clearly related, but they are far from identical. The principal component
(PC)-based surprise measure has more variation than can be explained by
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17. When we apply this technique to the above data set, we normalize each variable by its
standard deviation.
18. The table shows the variance of the ﬁrst factor relative to all of the other factors. But
that statistic is nearly identical to the fraction of the variance of the market interest rates ex-
plained by the ﬁrst factor.
19. For comparison, if we conduct the same exercise in the nonevent window considered in
the preceding (the thirty-minute window bracketing 2:30), we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst factor explains
only 80 percent of the variance of the asset prices. Thus, it does appear that the data release
window contains an even event that causes a comovement in the asset prices that is larger than
that observed at other times.the survey-based surprise measure, presumably capturing the additional
information in the release.
Table 8.4 also reports the loadings of the various asset prices on the PC-
based surprise measure. For ease of interpretation, we have normalized 
each PC measure to have a unitary standard deviation, just as we did with
the survey-based surprises used in the ES exercise. The coeﬃcients retain
many of the interesting patterns observed in the earlier results. The market
interest rates considered have a sizable response to the macroeconomic
news, suggesting that the news is aﬀecting the expected path of monetary
policy. Those responses are typically also observed at longer-term ma-
turities.
One puzzling aspect of the results is that the equity market no longer ap-
pears to have as large of a negative reaction to incoming data on inﬂation.
It is true that the ﬁrst factor explains a larger fraction of equity price move-
ments for the inﬂation-related data releases than for other releases, but the
response relative to the interest-rate response is smaller than in the pre-
ceding results. Instead, the factor analysis essentially ﬁnds a separate fac-
tor that drives much of the movements in equity prices. We wonder whether
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Table 8.4 Eﬀects of macroeconomic data surprises on asset prices: principal 
components approach
Variance Amount
explained explained by Factor loadings
by ﬁrst survey-based
ED2 ED4 Y2 Y10 S&P factor data surprise
Employment report 8.4 11.9 9.9 8.1 –0.15 0.98 0.55
GDP (advance) 3.8 5.6 4.8 4.8 –0.14 0.95 0.13
Retail sales (excl. autos) 4.0 5.4 4.4 3.7 –0.04 0.96 0.16
Core Consumer Price Index 3.1 4.2 3.6 3.4 –0.23 0.94 0.21
Core Producer Price Index 3.1 4.2 3.6 3.3 –0.14 0.95 0.14
Housing starts 2.1 2.9 2.2 1.9 –0.03 0.91 0.02
Durable goods 2.6 3.7 2.8 2.6 –0.05 0.94 0.19
Capacity utilization 2.3 3.1 2.2 2.0 0.05 0.91 0.20
ISM Manufacturing Index 3.3 5.1 4.1 4.0 –0.02 0.96 0.42
Chicago Purchasing 
Manufacturers Index 2.1 3.6 2.6 2.3 0.22 0.92 0.34
Consumer conﬁdence 2.9 3.9 3.1 2.8 0.12 0.96 0.24
New home sales 2.3 3.1 2.6 2.4 0.02 0.94 0.15
Notes: The table shows the responses of the ﬁnancial variable (in basis points for rates and percentage
points for equities) to a 1 standard deviation surprise in the ﬁrst principal component. ED2   the rate
on the second eurodollar futures contract (a proxy for policy monetary expectations about six months
ahead); ED4   the rate on the fourth eurodollar futures contract (a proxy for policy monetary expecta-
tions about twelve months ahead); Y2  the two-year Treasury yield; Y10  the ten-year Treasury yield;
and S&P   the S&P 500 index. The last column reports the R-squared statistic from a regression of the
ﬁrst factor on the particular survey-based data surprise (two surprises in the case of the employment
report).this ﬁnding in part reﬂects that we are forced to use a wider window for the
equity price movements (seventeen and a half hours instead of thirty min-
utes!), which considerably weakens the identiﬁcation assumption used in
the PC exercise.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the PC exercise is its usefulness for
assessing the amount of variation in yields that can be attributed to macro-
economic data. The PC exercise indicates that markets are much more sen-
sitive to macroeconomic data releases than suggested by the ES approach.
This is a similar ﬁnding as the IC estimator used in the preceding. However,
in this case, the reason is not only that we are accounting for the measure-
ment error in the survey-based surprise measure, but also because we are
accounting for any other relevant information in the release.
One useful aspect of the PC approach is that, unlike the case for the IC
estimator, we recover a time series of the true macroeconomic news, as dis-
cussed in the preceding. This allows us to cumulate the eﬀects of each re-
lease on a particular asset price. Figure 8.3 shows the cumulative eﬀects of
each the data releases on the two-year Treasury yield, where each line rep-
resents an individual release. (For example, one line represents the eﬀects
of all retail sales releases over our sample.) The point of ﬁgure 8.3 is not to
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Fig. 8.2 Surprise measures for retail sales: First principal component versus
survey-based measureFig. 8.3 Cumulative eﬀects of individual data releases on two-year yield (one line
per release, in basis points)focus on any particular line, but to get a general sense of the total variation
explained under the two approaches. As can be seen, the movements ex-
plained by the releases under the ES exercise are much smaller than those
under the PC exercise.
Table 8.5 contains some statistics that further quantify the variation ex-
plained under the two approaches. It computes the absolute value of the
changes attributable to each release, expressed as basis points per year. By
this measure, the most inﬂuential data release, by far, has been the em-
ployment report. Other inﬂuential releases include retail sales, the ISM in-
dex, the CPI, and the PPI.
More important, the PC measure accounts for much more variation
than the standard eventstudy approach. (This, of course, is simply a diﬀer-
ent way of expressing that the R-squared statistic from the regression in-
creases signiﬁcantly.) Indeed, this is the case for every single data release
considered. We can sum these statistics across all of the releases to obtain
a measure of the total variation explained by incoming macroeconomic
data (or at least by our releases). By that measure, the PC approach has ac-
counted for nearly twice as much of the variation in the two-year yield than
the ES approach. Thus, the new methodology makes an important step to-
ward better understanding the total inﬂuence of macroeconomic data on
asset prices and monetary policy expectations.
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Table 8.5 Variation in the two-year treasury yield explained by macroeconomic
surprises
Sum of absolute changes per year
Eventstudy Principal component
Release approach approach
Employment report 66 86
GDP (advance) 6 14
Retail sales (excl. autos) 15 36
Core Consumer Price Index 16 30
Core Producer Price Index 10 31
Housing starts 4 19
Durable goods 12 21
Capacity utilization 10 18
ISM Manufacturing Index 24 34
Chicago Purchasing Manufacturers Index 13 25
Consumer conﬁdence 13 23
New home sales 10 20
Total 199 357
Notes: The table reports the sum of the absolute value of changes in the two-year yield at-
tributable to the economic release under the two approaches. These changes are then summed
over the sample for each variable and scaled by the number of releases per year divided by the
total number of releases in the sample.8.6 Implications and Conclusions
We have learned a lot from the standard eventstudy literature. This chap-
ter begins with that approach, implementing it with the beneﬁt of using
intraday data and looking across a variety of asset prices. The eventstudy
exercise clearly establishes a set of facts that macroeconomists should
strive to explain when writing down models of the interactions of macro-
economic developments, monetary policy, and asset prices.
There are three broad observations that derive from the eventstudy ex-
ercise. First, policy expectations systematically respond to incoming data,
with evidence of stronger-than-expected growth or higher-than-expected
inﬂation leading to an upward revision to the expected federal funds rate
path (as reﬂected in eurodollar futures rates and the two-year Treasury
yield). Second, the inﬂuence of that data on the yield curve extends to very
long maturities (the ten-year yield in our exercise). And third, equities
show very mixed reactions to incoming data on growth but negative and
signiﬁcant reactions to data on inﬂation.
Many of these patterns align well with current macroeconomic models.
Those models typically assume that monetary policy is systematically re-
lated to incoming data—a relationship that should also be apparent in the
high-frequency data. The responsiveness of longer-term Treasury yields 
is somewhat more challenging to explain in current models, in part due to
the diﬃculty associated with understanding the determination of long-
horizon expectations, but it, too, has been taken up in the recent literature.
Last, as discussed in the preceding, the lack of response of equities to
demand-side indicators could reﬂect that those releases aﬀect both expected
dividend growth and interest rates, with oﬀsetting eﬀects on stock prices.
Nevertheless, the eventstudy estimates leave one signiﬁcant shortcoming
in our understanding of market dynamics—that the measured data sur-
prises explain only a small portion of the variation in asset prices and mon-
etary policy expectations. This chapter argues that this shortcoming likely
reﬂects mismeasurement of the macroeconomic news.
We developed two new approaches to better account for the inﬂuence of
the macroeconomic news under the assumption that the measured sur-
prises are noisy. The ﬁrst is a new econometric technique for accounting for
error-in-variables, one that has the potential to be used in other applica-
tions as well. The second is a principal components approach that takes ad-
vantage of our ability (using intraday data) to zero in on the asset price
movements right around the release.
The new estimators do not signiﬁcantly change the patterns of the mar-
ket responses that we obtain from the standard eventstudy approach. That
is, the patterns found under the ES approach (including the three observa-
tions noted in the preceding) still represent a set of observations that
should be explained by macroeconomic models. However, the two new ap-
360 Robert Rigobon and Brian Sackproaches suggest that incoming news generally has a much bigger impact
on asset prices than captured by the eventstudy approach.
In the case of the IC estimator, the results suggest that the noise in the
measure of the data surprise causes a downward bias in the measured sen-
sitivity of asset prices to that information. The PC estimator also suggests
that this may be the case, and it also allows for the possibility that there is
other market-sensitive news in the data release beyond the macroeconomic
surprise included in the eventstudy regression.
In sum, we argue that the sensitivity of asset prices and monetary policy
expectations to high-frequency information on macroeconomic condi-
tions is likely to be greater than captured in previous studies. This ﬁnding
accords well with the view that monetary policy systematically responds to
economic conditions, and that asset prices more broadly are strongly in-
ﬂuenced by the evolution of the economy and policy expectations.
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Comment Leonardo Bartolini
Rigobon and Sack’s nice chapter rightly points its ﬁnger to serious prob-
lems with our often-too-eager use of survey-based expectations data and
oﬀers a solution for some of these problems. Survey data are likely to cap-
ture investors’ expectations with large errors. Hence, their use to construct
measures of macroeconomic news induces a classic attenuation bias that
may explain the weak response of asset prices to news documented in re-
cent studies. For instance, Faust et al. (2003) estimate the ten-year U.S. in-
terest rate to rise by 13 basis points in response to a 1 percent unexpected
tightening in the Fed Funds rate—a small and just statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect. Surely, many scholars of ﬁnancial markets would maintain that
most macroeconomic announcements should not be expected to have a
large impact on asset prices and would not be surprised by the small size 
of estimates such as those of Faust et al. (2003). Even so, the debate on
whether estimated weak responses of prices to news are puzzling would
surely beneﬁt by improved measurement of the news content of macroeco-
nomic announcements, which is Rigobon and Sack’s goal in this chapter.
For this reason, this chapter makes a useful methodological contribution,
also oﬀering estimates of the response of asset prices to news that improve
on received wisdom.
Despite such improvement, there are reasons suggesting that the re-
sponse of asset prices to news estimated by Rigobon and Sack—up to ten
times stronger than previously estimated—might overstate the true re-
sponse of asset prices to macroeconomic announcements, possibly by a
substantial amount. To assess this view, let me start by agreeing whole-
heartedly with the chapter’s key premise: survey-based measures of expec-
tations are marred by such deep problems that special care should be taken
to develop methods to address their deﬁciencies. Among such problems,
notable is the fact that such surveys are typically conducted well in advance
of data announcements, with leads ranging from a few days to a couple of
weeks. Such leads imply that by the time of the announcement, much in-
formation on the released series has accumulated, making much of the
“measured” news just not news any longer. This sampling-lead problem
does not, on its own account, invalidate the rationality of the initial fore-
cast. If forecasters form their expectations rationally, “measured news”
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York.diﬀers from “true news”—that is, news relative to information available
one instant before the announcement—by noise only. Such noise com-
pounds with more traditional measurement errors and can be dealt with by
the clever variant of standard error-in-variables estimation methods pro-
posed by Rigobon and Sack.
Sampling leads and measurement errors are not the only problem with
forecast data, however. Other problems with such data may lead to biased
(conditionally and unconditionally) forecasts that are not readily dealt
with by the “censored” estimation method suggested by the authors. For
instance, individual forecasts may be biased because of the unusual incen-
tives faced by forecasters to maximize their public recognition. Because the
names and aﬃliation of forecasters participating in the Bloomberg survey
used by Rigobon and Sack and in other common surveys are publicly
listed, forecasters may have an incentive to forecast in the tail of the fore-
cast distribution, as this increases their chances of being the forecaster that
comes closest to the actual release (Laster, Bennett, and Geoum 1999; La-
mont, 2002). Some forecasters have also been found to distort forecasts
toward realizations that beneﬁt their ﬁrm, in a way that Ito (1990) dubs
“wishful expectations.” Depending on how advanced signals on the even-
tual data release are distributed among forecasters, a bias in individual
forecasts may cause a bias in the consensus (that is, median or mean) fore-
cast as well. Finally, forecast data are often found not to reﬂect eﬃciently
publicly available information. This feature is hardly surprising, as fore-
casters have weak monetary incentives to oﬀer best forecasts: the forecast-
ers themselves are seldom investment managers, that is, agents with an
incentive to put their money where their mouths are. For instance, fore-
casters have been documented not to learn quickly from mistakes, leading
to serially correlated forecast errors (see, for instance, Mankiw Reis, and
Wolfers [2003] and Gürkaynak and Wolfers [2005]). None of these prob-
lems is attacked by the methodology of Rigobon and Sack, thus leaving
scope for overestimating the response of asset prices to news.
To illustrate this point, let’s focus on Rigobon and Sack’s neatest contri-
bution—“identiﬁcation through censoring”—which involves the follow-
ing: ﬁrst, to view the estimation of the news content of macroeconomic an-
nouncements as a classic error-in-variables problem. Second, to cast such
problem as a matter of underidentiﬁcation. And, ﬁnally, to identify the
model by adding suitable restrictions to the covariance matrix. In fairness
to previous research, I should note that viewing error-in-variables as an is-
sue of underidentiﬁcation has a time-honored tradition, and equally hon-
ored is the tradition of adding restrictions to the covariance matrix to
achieve identiﬁcation.1 The key novelty in Rigobon and Sack’s work is to
recognize that the variance of the measured news process and of its noise
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1. See, for instance, Judge et al. (1982), chapter 19.component must be zero at all times other than at the time of the an-
nouncement. This observation yields a natural restriction to impose on the
covariance matrix to achieve full identiﬁcation.
Take then the authors’ basic model of error-in-forecast-measurement:
(1)  st    zt
∗   εt
(2) zt   zt
∗    t,
where zt is “measured news” (that is, data – data expected at t – 1) and zt
∗ is
“true news” (that is, data – data expected att – dt). We are interested in the
coeﬃcient  , for which ordinary least squares (OLS) provides a biased and
inconsistent estimator, as in a classic error-in-variables problem. There is
no instrument correlated with true news that can be used to address this
problem: if there were one such instrument, zt
∗would not be news anymore.
Let us then follow the authors and obtain the additional condition to
identify the model by recognizing that the variance of the asset price on
nonannouncement days should equal its “structural” variance  ε
2, deﬁned
as the variance of the asset when zt
∗   0. (This is a critical assumption,
which is further discussed in the following.) However, let us drop the as-
sumption that the measurement error has zero mean conditional on the
true surprise. That is, let E [ t | zt
∗]   0, a relaxation that puts us outside the
classic error-in-variables model. Consistent with much previous evidence
that news derived from survey forecasts is serially correlated, suppose that
measured news follows the partial adjustment model
(3) zt   (1    )z
∗
t 1    zt 1    t.
In this case, one obtains
(4) var( st   1)    ε
2,
(5) var( st)    2 2
z∗    ε
2,
(6) cov( st, zt)    (1    ) 2
z∗,
where equations (4) and (5) are unchanged relative to Rigobon and Sack’s
analysis, while equation (6) accounts for the sluggish response of measured
news. In this case, the estimator   becomes
(7)   (1    ) ,
which diﬀers from Rigobon and Sack’s censored estimator   [var( st) –
var( st – 1)]/[cov( st, zt)] by the term (1 –  ). Therefore, when news mea-
sured from survey data adjusts gradually to true news, Rigobon and Sack’s
estimator is biased upward.
Is this bias quantitatively signiﬁcant? Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003)
estimate that about half of the error in inﬂation expectations from four ma-
var( st)   var( st 1)
   
cov( st, zt)
364 Robert Rigobon and Brian Sackjor surveys remains in the median forecast after one year. So the bias may
be signiﬁcant for some surveys. It may or may not be so for Rigobon and
Sack’s data, depending on the time series properties of their forecast errors.
Another key feature of forecast data that does not ﬁt neatly into the
error-in-variables framework, and which may contribute to an upward bias
in Rigobon and Sack’s estimated response of asset prices to news, is het-
erogeneity in forecasters’ beliefs. Beliefs heterogeneity, illustrated by the
sizable dispersion of individual forecasts in survey data, is a central tenet
in the ﬁnancial analysis of asset trading, from which the macroeconomics
literature often abstracts. In the case of Rigobon and Sack’s chapter, the
cost of such abstraction is that the response of asset prices to news may be
overestimated.
To see this point, consider again the censored estimator,   [var( st) –
var( st – 1)]/cov( st, zt), and note the key identifying assumption that the
“structural” (i.e., net-of-news) volatility of asset prices,  ε
2, is the same at
announcement time (say, 8:30 a.m.) in announcement days, t, and non-
announcement days, t – 1. This assumption allows attributing the entire
rise in volatility at announcement time, var( st) – var( st–1), to the eﬀect
of news. The estimator   then increases linearly with var( st) – var( st–1).
Rigobon and Sack generalize this assumption somewhat, allowing for  ε
2
to rise at announcement time in predictable fashion over its previous after-
noon’s level (at 2:30 p.m.) as in
(8)  2
ε,t 1,8:30    2
ε,t 2,2:30    2
ε,t,8:30    2
ε,t 1,2:30
According to equation (8), the increase in  ε
2 from its previous after-
noon’s level in announcement days is the same as the corresponding in-
crease in nonannouncement days. However, rewriting equation (8) as
(9)  2
ε,t,8:30    2
ε,t 1,8:30    2
ε,t 1,2:30    2
ε,t 2,2:30
makes it apparent that equation (8) extends the benchmark assumption
 2
ε,t,8:30    2
ε,t–1,8:30 only if  ε
2 diﬀers signiﬁcantly at 2:30 in the two nonan-
nouncement days prior to t. My best guess is that there is no systematic
diﬀerence in 2:30 p.m. volatility between t– 1 and t– 2 so that equations (8)
and (9) eﬀectively reduce to  2
ε,t,8:30    2
ε,t–1,8:30.
While I have no hard data on hand to document this conjecture, indirect
evidence seems compelling enough. Consider, for instance, ﬁgure 8C.1,
which draws data from Fleming and Remolona (1999), the benchmark
study of the minute-by-minute behavior of the Treasury market examined
by Rigobon and Sack.2
Figure 8C.l plots data on intraday price volatility in the ﬁve-year Treasury
note market, distinguishing between announcement and nonannounce-
ment days. To assess my conjecture that  2
ε,t–1,2:30    2
ε,t–2,2:30, I would need 
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.a breakdown of volatility in the two days prior to announcements. The
data I obtained do not oﬀer such breakdown, but ﬁgure 8C.1 shows that
there is negligible diﬀerence in 2:30 p.m. volatility even between an-
nouncement and nonannouncement days. I ﬁnd it hard to believe, then,
that there might be a systematic diﬀerence in volatility between two (al-
most random) nonannouncement days. if there is no such gap in volatility,
Rigobon and sack’s identifying restriction then reduces to assuming that
the “structural” price variance at announcement time—that is, the vari-
ance when the macroeconomic release comes at its median (or mean) fore-
cast—equals the variance at the same time in nonannouncement days.
Rigobon and Sack’s censored estimator can then be represented in ﬁgure
8C.1 as the distance between point A and point B (scaled by cov[ st, zt]),
where point B captures the price volatility that would have been recorded
with no news.
There are reasons, however, to believe that the volatility at announce-
ment time will be higher in announcement days than in nonannouncement
days even when zt
∗ 0. The key reason is that in a world with heterogeneous
beliefs, zt
∗   0 is news to all but the median (or mean) forecaster. Almost all
investors will want to trade on the announcement, which has come either
higher or lower than they individually expected. Much of this trading may
reﬂect private information about the impact of the announcement, induc-
ing price volatility along channels well studied in the ﬁnance literature.
While I am not aware of any direct evidence corroborating the view that
even announcements at the median forecast generate price volatility, a con-
siderable amount of indirect evidence comes to its support. Fleming and
Remolona (1999), for instance, show that bid-ask spreads widen and trad-
ing volumes decline in the Treasury market in advance of macroeconomic
announcements, with both indicators retracing their way upon announce-
ments. This evidence suggests that, in a way, trading volume and price
volatility might shift from just before to just after announcement times, ir-
respective of the actual data release. Other evidence is provided by studies
showing that asset price volatility upon announcement rises with the pre-
announcement dispersion in beliefs (see, for instance, Green [2004] and
Pasquariello and Vega [2006]). Because there is always some dispersion in
beliefs about the release in announcement days (while there is none, by def-
inition, in nonannouncement days), structural price volatility is bound to
be higher at announcement times even when zt
∗   0. More anecdotally,
market participants report opening large positions (long or short, depend-
ing on beliefs) in anticipation of releases. These positions get unwound
upon announcement, whether the release comes in at its median value or
not. As trading volume rises, price volatility is likely to do the same.
In sum, if announcement and nonannouncement days are structurally
diﬀerent in terms of trade dynamics, announcement days are likely associ-
ated with higher structural volatility. If properly incorporated, this larger
Noisy Macroeconomic Announcements, Monetary Policy, and Asset Prices 367volatility would imply a lower numerator and, hence, a lower value, for
Rigobon and Sack’s censored estimator  . Illustratively, in ﬁgure 8C.1,
news may be responsible for lifting volatility not from point B to point A,
but from, say, point C to point A.
Finally, here is a word on the results, which are broadly sensible. The gist
of the analysis is that the censored estimates of the impact of news on asset
prices are larger than those yielded by event studies that disregard the pos-
sibility of attenuation bias. One puzzling aspect of Rigobon and Sack’s re-
sults is that certain data releases, such as capacity utilization, Institute for
Supply Management (ISM), consumer conﬁdence, and new home sales,
are estimated to consist almost entirely of noise. These estimates boost the
estimated coeﬃcients   tenfold above the coeﬃcients yielded by earlier
event studies. I ﬁnd the estimated noise component of these indicators to
be implausible and view these results as strengthening my belief that the
forecast data examined here might not quite ﬁt the classic error-in-
variables model.
In sum, this is a nice chapter that oﬀers a considerable improvement in
our understanding of the impact of news on asset prices. The methodology
oﬀered by the authors may not correct for all the shortcomings associated
with survey forecast data, but certainly makes a signiﬁcant advance in cor-
recting for a ﬁrst-order problem that has been disregarded in previous
studies of the impact of news on asset prices.
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Discussion Summary
Richard H. Clarida observed that before announcements of payroll or
Consumer Price Index (CPI) numbers, market participants often posi-
tioned themselves in volatility trades so that they would do well whether
the market moved up or down. In that context, it would be interesting to
see what happened when the number came out at consensus.
Drawing a connection with earlier discussions, Marvin Goodfriend said
that the fact that the authors found a signiﬁcant announcement eﬀect on
long-term interest rates may be a manifestation of classic optimal mone-
tary policy: short rates are expected to be persistent. He also noted that it
was interesting that equity prices only tended to respond to inﬂation news,
as optimal monetary policy makes the world behave as much as possible
like a ﬂexible price economy.
Thomas Laubach said that news aﬀects asset prices primarily by chang-
ing expectations of future policy actions. In that light, it would be interest-
ing to look at time variation, perhaps by splitting into subsamples: for ex-
ample, in 2001, the CPI was not particularly interesting, but in 2003, when
people were worried about inﬂation, it was probably watched more closely.
Sack responded that it was hard to estimate time varying eﬀects but that
this could perhaps be achieved using the principal component approach.
He also drew attention to the fact that in a separate paper with coauthors,
he had found that forward rates ten years out respond strongly to news.
John C. Williams and Stephen G. Cecchetti suggested that one could use
more information from surveys than just the median forecast. Williams
proposed examining the interaction between announcement eﬀects and
the dispersion in beliefs in the survey. Cecchetti noted that in principle it
should be possible to use an optimal weighting of forecasts.
Clarida commented that Goldman Sachs has economic derivatives con-
tingent on payrolls data. He said that it was surprising how close the ﬁrst
moment was to the Bloomberg consensus. Sack observed that the price his-
tory on these assets was still short.
John Y. Campbell said that there was an interesting parallel between the
macroeconomic announcements studied in this chapter and the an-
nouncements of corporate earnings studied in the ﬁnance literature. First,
there are private data vendors such as StarMine that reweight individual
analysts’ earnings forecasts optimally. Second, Andrea Frazzini and Owen
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ings announcements were positive—there is money to be made by buying
equities around the times of their earnings announcements. One explana-
tion of this is that risk is concentrated around the earnings announcement.
He asked whether the authors had calculated unconditional mean returns
around announcements. Sack replied that they had not focused on uncon-
ditional means but that the option markets certainly recognized that there
was considerable risk surrounding announcements.
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